In the early morning hours of June 24, 2021, unrelated to an act of terrorism or natural causes, a 12-story, steel-reinforced concrete, occupied condominium partially collapsed. Of the 136 units, 72 were involved in the collapse. Leading up to the collapse, numerous 911 calls were made reporting “water flowing in the parking garage,” “a banging sound,” the fire alarm sounding, and “rumbling like an earthquake,” to name a few. No one would have expected that a structural failure was occurring that cascaded into a pancake-type collapse of two-thirds of the building.
Surfside, Florida, is a municipality located along Florida’s southeast coast, bordered by Miami Beach to the south and Bal Harbor to the north. The city is made up of residential, commercial, and high-rise structures occupied by full-time and seasonal residents. The city, along with surrounding cities, is home to a large Orthodox Jewish population, which would ultimately impact many aspects of the operation.
Miami-Dade (FL) Fire Rescue (MDFR) protects the unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County and 29 municipalities including Surfside. MDFR would be faced with the unimaginable task of managing an occupied collapsed structure. The actions taken by the first-arriving units were nothing short of heroic, focused on rescuing those uninjured but trapped in the remaining structure and removing those from the collapse area who were lightly trapped. Company officers had to place members into harm’s way without the luxury of consultation with structural engineers or other search and rescue specialists who could determine if there was the potential for a secondary collapse. As removal of the victims cut off from egress was taking place, primarily over aerial ladders, technical rescue personnel were implementing a collapse search and rescue plan, which included the following:
First responding companies from MDFR were augmented by numerous mutual-aid companies from Miami Beach, Miami, Hialeah, Coral Gables, and Broward County. In total, approximately 100 units were on scene as part of the initial response. MDFR, as the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) for this incident, assembled a Type III Incident Management Team (IMT) to take over from the initial incident command resources. The IMT unified with agencies that would ultimately have responsibilities related to this incident, including the following:
MDFR remained as the AHJ until the transition from rescue to recovery occurred, at which time Miami-Dade Police became the responsible party.
As part of MDFR’s initial response to a building collapse, elements of FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) FL-TF1 were deployed, including structural engineers and canine search teams. These resources began work before the sun rose. Additional elements of FL-TF1 were recalled, assembling rescue squads, followed by the activation of the full Type I Task Force. Already providing mutual-aid companies to the event, the City of Miami (FL) Fire Rescue mobilized FL-TF2 as a Type I US&R Task Force and, when requested, deployed the next morning.
Requests were made on the first morning for heavy equipment to assist with debris removal. This included a 400-ton crane, a 250-ton crane, numerous front-end loaders, and a demolition excavator nicknamed “the nibbler.” This piece of equipment had a hydraulic gripping device that was an effective tool when there was a need to surgically remove pieces of debris. South Florida is a resource-rich area, and still there was a potential for delay in getting this equipment. The early request proved to be a great decision by the IMT.
The initial size-up by the first-arriving company officer ultimately triggered the activation of regional and State of Florida resources almost immediately, which dramatically reduced the time for help to respond. As part of the State of Florida’s disaster response plan, there is a State Warning Point (SWP) staffed 24/7 in the state’s emergency operations center. There are preestablished incident types that must be communicated to the SWP by the local emergency management agency. In this case, the mass casualty declaration by the first-arriving company officer triggered the notification. When the Miami-Dade County Office of Emergency Management notified Florida’s SWP, key personnel were activated including the coordinator for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 4, Fire and ESF 9, Search and Rescue. ESF 4/9 is managed by the State Fire Marshal’s Office and fire rescue resources coordinated through the Florida Fire Chiefs Association (FFCA) Statewide Emergency Response Plan (SERP).
The SERP was born out of lessons learned after Hurricane Andrew, which devastated South Florida in 1992. In the aftermath, MDFR Chief R. David Paulison was quoted as saying, “The best thing that happened to us was all of the help that came, and the worst thing that happened to us was all of the help that came.” Fire rescue resources poured in to help, but there was no place to house them, no way to feed them, and no way to coordinate their activities. The SERP was developed to initially coordinate just fire rescue resources but later absorbed other disciplines such as US&R, emergency medical services, and communications support.
After September 11, the State of Florida began to develop a state US&R system to augment the two US&R Task Forces, FL-TF1 sponsored by MDFR and FL-TF2 sponsored by Miami Fire Rescue, which are part of the DHS/FEMA National US&R Response System. Task Forces were created using State Homeland Security Grant Program funds as well as a substantial commitment from the local sponsoring and participating agencies. Florida’s US&R System is now comprised of the following types of US&R resources:
As the complexities of this disaster began to become clearer at first light, the need for additional US&R resources became evident. The local resources including FL-TF1 and FL-TF2 did not have the ability to sustain an around-the-clock operation for what could potentially be weeks. Working with the IMT, a strategy for requesting additional US&R resources was developed that began with the phased mobilization of all six of the remaining US&R Task Forces from Florida. In addition, the National US&R Branch was notified of the incident and the probable need for additional resources was communicated. Through the FFCA SERP process, the request was made for the following US&R resources, which deployed in a phased response over 36 hours:
Once fully operational, there were more than 400 search and rescue personnel working on the 1.4-acre site, around the clock, seven days a week. Crews were put on 12-hour shifts operating either from midnight until noon or from noon until midnight. These “nontraditional” operational periods were developed to limit the exposure of search and rescue personnel to the South Florida heat and humidity during the daylight hours. Because of the various sizes of US&R Task Forces on site, from Type I to Type IV, Task Forces were unified on each shift to work as one. Seven to eight five-person rescue squads were assembled from all personnel on the shift. These squads would work on “the Pile” for 30 to 45 minutes, then rotate into decon and rehab. When this occurred, seven to eight fresh rescue squads went to work for 30 to 45 minutes, at which time they would rotate off. These cycles continued through the entire 12-hour operational period. The search plan continued to focus on selected debris removal and looking for survivable void spaces. Additional assistance was provided by 30 local firefighters per operational period, deployed as single resources to staff “bucket brigades,” assisting with debris removal.
Since the development of the Florida US&R System, most responses involved postweather events, specifically hurricanes. It has been said, “You are only as good as your last response.” In other words, you grow accustomed to what the response will be as compared to previous like-responses. The focus on hurricane response is structural triage and wide-area search often covering a large geographical area. Task Forces would typically be assigned to a local jurisdiction in support of their initiatives. Overall support for these hurricane responses was provided through a partnership with a Florida Forest Service (FFS) IMT. After numerous hurricane responses, the Task Force-FFS IMT relationship has strengthened.
In the case of the Surfside collapse, multiple Task Forces were operating in a compressed 1.4-acre site under the already established IMT. The needs of the incident as well as the ongoing needs of the Task Forces created a situation where the original two-person oversight team that deployed on behalf of ESF 4/9 to assist with the coordination of US&R activities was quickly overwhelmed. This created delays in fulfilling the needs of the IMT as well as the Task Forces.
A decision was made that was approved by the IMT to request from DHS/FEMA a US&R Incident Support Team (IST). This team is comprised of subject matter experts in US&R and is designed to support the existing command structure with coordinating the needs of the US&R personnel. Everything from operations to planning, logistics, and communications is managed by this team. This proved to be a very good decision that allowed sufficient overhead personnel to support the US&R mission while the IMT managed the overall incident.
This incident required an ongoing focus on safety for those operating on the pile. Immediately after the initial collapse and after a complete search and removal of all the survivors from the existing structure, the existing structure was identified as a “no-go” area. Additionally, 40 feet from the existing structure across the collapse site was identified as an exclusion zone for surface work. This was because of the potential of falling debris, aka “widow makers” hanging off the remaining structure.
The remaining structure was monitored by structural engineers using Total Station Theodolites (TSTs) from multiple locations 24/7. These TSTs can detect the slightest movement of a structure and sound an alert. Initially, two TSTs were deployed; later, this number was increased to four. Because of the demand on the structural engineers, additional structural specialists from the National US&R System were requested and deployed. An evacuation plan was developed for both a potential collapse and a weather event such as high winds and lightning. Task Force safety officers had either a whistle or an air horn to alert personnel using the International Alerting System as follows:
Task Force hazmat specialists conducted ongoing air monitoring as well as established the required personal protective equipment plan and decon plan. In addition to the air monitoring, several other entities were conducting concurrent sampling including the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Health and Safety Section and the University of Miami’s Sylvester’s Comprehensive Cancer Center.
The fire service has identified the mental well-being of first responders as a priority for several years. Leadership at the state level recognized early on the complexities of this event and the impact it would have on the first responders and US&R personnel. In the past, personnel received some form of debriefing after their work had been done or on demobilization. For the first time in our history, coordinated through the SERP, mental wellness professionals were deployed from the Florida Firefighters Safety and Health Collaborative. These trained personnel were on the ground operating 24/7 less than three days after the incident occurred. Specifically, three areas were addressed: the initial first responders, support the Family Notification Center, and work daily with the rescue personnel. Team members would meet rescuers at their camp after an operational period as well as see anyone who requested. This group, under the Medical Branch of the IMT, coordinated and vetted the other mental wellness groups that responded, working closely with the IAFF. Along with the daily interactions, the Mental Wellness Group met with each Task Force on demobilization and continues to communicate and assist with Task Force members to this day.
As with any complex incident, challenges always present themselves that need to be addressed. Challenges during this incident included coordinating areas searched, a stubborn smoldering fire, structural stability, adherence to religious customs, and the hazards associated with the remaining structure.
US&R personnel are familiar with the Survey123 application. For the most part, this application has been used to document wide-area searches and structural triage posthurricane or flood. This application proved very beneficial on this incident to assist with the documentation and reporting of victim location, hazards, and areas searched. When meeting with the families, the AHJ was able to show the amount of area covered daily. This helped with the frequent speculation that not enough was being done.
Hours after the collapse, a small smoldering fire developed in the A/B corner of the site. This fire began to intensify, and the decision was made to create a trench with the heavy equipment to cut off any forward progress of the fire. In concert with this tactic was the application of water to the site along with the use of massive dewatering pumps provided by Miami-Dade County Water and Sewer Department to limit any flooding into other collapse areas. Within 12 hours, the fire was suppressed and the water inundation was limited.
The stability and any potential movement of the remaining structure were monitored continuously. In the early hours one morning, a rescuer reported hearing “sounds” consistent with structural movement around one of the vulnerable columns supporting the existing structure. This resulted in an evacuation of the work site and evaluation of the issue. Engineers reviewed the observations and the data from their TSTs to formulate a plan of how to operate on the pile moving forward. This plan called for the expansion of the exclusion zone on the surface from 40 feet off the existing structure to 100 feet and the increase of TSTs from two to four.
This incident happened in a prevalent Orthodox Jewish community, and the building was occupied by many people of the Jewish faith. Based on religious customs of the Jewish faith, a recovery plan was developed and implemented as to how to handle victim remains. For example, if a victim was located, after law enforcement conducted documentation, the victim or the remains would be removed as well as any of the surrounding area the body fluids had touched such as the mattress the victim was lying on or rubble and dirt in the area. This increased the work and time rescuers took to remove each victim, but the rescuers adapted and adhered to the plan to respect the customs.
The 12-story structure that remained posed a potential collapse problem since the initial collapse occurred. With a tropical storm forming to the east, a concern developed about the possibility of tropical storm-force winds impacting the incident area in the coming days and what effect that would have on the structure. All agreed that there was a potential for an uncontrolled collapse and that the solution would be to conduct a controlled demolition as soon as possible. A private contractor with considerable experience was hired to conduct the demolition. In preparation, rescue operations were paused, and personnel assisted with the placement of a tarp over what was now being called the “historic” rubble. This was done to protect the area in the event any debris from the demolition “spilled over” on top of the area already worked. The demolition occurred on July 4 at 2230 hours; one hour after it was completed, rescue operations resumed with all exclusion areas removed.
Early in the rescue operations, members of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) US&R Team arrived on scene. It is unclear who requested their assistance but, based on the prominent Jewish population in the community, their assistance proved to be a tremendous benefit in the overall operation. Initially, the team was comprised of 12 members, later expanding to 15. Of the 12, three members were investigators, and they deployed to the Family Assistance Center, with the remaining members split between FL-TF1 and FL-TF2.
The IDF rescuers have considerable experience in managing building collapses, and they brought with them a willingness to assist and support the overall rescue mission at Surfside. One resource they brought to this incident was an incredibly detailed investigation that took place with every person deemed missing that was of the Jewish faith. The investigators from the team conducted detailed interviews with the family members of those missing and, in turn, were supported by as many as 50 investigators in Israel, operating in what they called the “backroom.” The level of detail provided was amazing, from furnishings in the home to keepsake jewelry that would be found on a victim as well as the kinds of prosthetic replacements. This information, coupled with items discovered during the building delayering process, allowed the IDF rescuers to develop a map that would show with surprising detail the potential location of those missing.
With intense breaching and breaking operations occurring 24 hours a day, as expected, tools began to break down and required repair. These breakdowns never impacted any operation, but they created ongoing challenges. Florida’s Division of Emergency Management Logistics Section took the proactive role early on to secure a rental agreement with a private contractor to provide all the necessary breaching and breaking tools as well as technicians on site to repair any breakdowns. This contract remained in place for the duration of the incident.
When a Task Force is deployed, one of the first things to consider is the duration they are expected to work and the development of a demobilization timeline. As was the case on this incident, discussions began early into the deployment as to when and how to rotate resources on and off the incident. The overarching goal was to always maintain the number of rescuers working. One of the considerations for the Florida Task Forces, never having been engaged in this type of long-term rescue operation, was the condition of the rescuers and the timeline for each Task Force to be resupplied and returned to a state of readiness for the next emergency. No one wanted to stop working and be replaced, but the physical as well as the mental toll this event was taking on everyone—especially the rescuers—became evident. The plan was developed and approved by the IMT to demobilize in a phased method each of the Florida Task Forces except for FL-TF1 and FL-TF2. The Florida Task Forces would be replaced by the following federal resources:
For members of MDFR and everyone in the South Florida fire service, this was a local event and, as such, it was recognized that the two local Task Forces that responded initially would remain until the end. To accomplish this, FL-TF1 and FL-TF2 leaders were tasked with developing a rotation plan that would allow for their members to get two to three days of rest and relaxation away from the incident and then return. The demobilization of Florida Task Forces and the engagement of five Type I federal Task Forces occurred flawlessly. Even more impressive was that because the Florida Division of Emergency Management Logistics Section had been working with each Task Force on current and future supply needs, all six of the Florida Task Forces were resupplied before they left the incident site or soon after return to the point of departure and were all operational ready to deploy within three days of returning.
The decision to transition from rescue to recovery, specific to search and rescue operations, was the responsibility of the IMT. This transition is never an easy one, and the decision of when to do it is complex, looking at many factors other than simply the time since the initial collapse. Factors that were considered included the following:
During the 28th operational period, the transition from rescue to recovery occurred. At 1800 hours, the families and loved ones of the victims assembled at the site, along with clergy from all faiths. All work stopped, and US&R personnel gathered with the families. Prayers and a moment of silence were conducted, after which a horn sounded, and personnel went back to work. Although the focus was different, the mission remained the same for all US&R personnel: to bring closure to every family.
As with any event, especially one with the magnitude of this collapse, lessons can be learned. There are actions that proved successful and opportunities for improvement. Overall, among rescue personnel and those supporting work on the collapse site, there were zero significant injuries. This was remarkable considering the complexity of the work and how much activity was going on at any one time and can be contributed to an ongoing commitment to safety throughout the incident. Additionally, the following are actions that proved successful on this incident:
The following are key opportunities for improving future responses:
In the hierarchy of structural collapses resulting in loss of life in our country, the collapse of the Champlain Towers South condominium ranked fourth behind the South Tower of the World Trade Center, the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, and the pedestrian bridge collapse in the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City. The complexities of this incident were, at times, like other collapses as well as unique to this collapse. From the arrival of the first unit through the recovery of the last victim 29 days after the collapse, the heroic actions and selfless dedication of every rescuer to bring closure to the families and loved ones of the 98 souls lost were unmatched. The seamless integration of local, regional, state, national, and international US&R resources was outstanding.
Dave Downey is the deputy coordinator for the Statewide Emergency Response Plan for ESF 4/9 in the State of Florida. He spent 19 days at the Champlain Towers South condominium collapse, coordinating state resources on behalf of the State Fire Marshal’s Office. He is a 37-year veteran of the fire service, having spent more than 30 years with Miami-Dade Fire Rescue, the last six as chief, retiring in 2019. Downey serves as the chair of the International Association of Fire Chiefs US&R Committee and is a Task Force leader with FL-TF1, having responded to disasters across the world including the World Trade Center, Hurricane Katrina, and the earthquake in Haiti.
This article is an account of search and rescue operations in the first hours following the collapse of the Champlain Towers South Condominium. Miami-Dade (FL) Fire Rescue (MDFR) personnel operating in the hours following the collapse did so at great risk, knowing that at any moment the rest of the building could collapse without warning and many of them would never return to their families. This account is limited to what I personally experienced and is in no manner an all-inclusive narrative of this horrific event.
I was working in my regular assignment as chief of MDFR Battalion (B) 12. In addition to responsibilities for a large area in western Miami-Dade County, B12 responds countywide on technical rescue incidents for entrapments, confined space rescues, rope rescues, and building collapses. Frequently, when B12 responds to an incident that is a significant distance away, the incident is resolved by companies and their respective battalion chiefs before B12 arrives. At complex and extended operations, B12 is usually assigned as the extrication or rescue group manager. MDFR technical rescue resources consist of a full complement of hydraulic extrication tools on every fire company; a heavy rescue squad; a 60-ton rotating wrecker/crane; and three “satellite” fire companies staffed by technical rescue personnel and equipped with specialized extrication, lifting, breaching, and rope rescue equipment.
After a lengthy response, I set out on foot to report to the command post (photo 1); along the way, I could see distressed occupants of the portion of the building that had not fully collapsed at their balconies, unable to escape. I knew that many of the occupants of this building were elderly, were physically impaired, and relied on walkers and wheelchairs for mobility.
(1) A view of Collins Avenue looking south and the command post in the parking lot across from the building on Collins Avenue. (Photos courtesy of Miami-Dade Fire Rescue.)
Also on the way, I met B11, our hazmat battalion chief. B11 is the chief of my neighboring battalion, so we are accustomed to operating together. I asked him if he knew the status of the building’s natural gas service, thinking this had been a gas explosion and seeing what appeared to be gas piping in the grass in front of the buildings. We were both concerned about the possibility of a secondary collapse of the portion of the building that remained standing.
I thought of the possible reasons for any building to collapse. The first one that came to mind was gas. The second one was that this was a deliberate act and whoever committed it was waiting for first responders to arrive in great numbers before detonating a secondary device. B11 and I reported to the incident commander (IC), who was B1, the first-arriving battalion chief. She directed us to perform a 360° size-up and report back to her. I asked her to get us a second radio channel for the technical rescue and hazmat units. Platform 21, a tower ladder, was positioned at the northwest corner of the building, rescuing occupants on their balconies. We encountered the captain of Engine 76, the first-arriving company, who reported that there were several occupants trapped in the rubble in need of rescue.
We continued to the north side of the building, where the magnitude of the collapse was clearly visible (photos 2, 3). Engine 76’s captain transmitted, on arrival, that it was a “World Trade Center-type collapse.” That was a perfectly accurate description for responding companies. While responding, I listened to the radio traffic and knew intuitively before arriving that this was a horrendous incident.
(2) A view of the collapsed portion of the building from what was left of the pool deck area on the C side.
(3) A view of the collapsed portion of the building from the stairwell landing.
Walking along the north side on 88th Street and onto the pile of rubble, we encountered two trapped victims—a young boy in his teens asking to save his mom. Although he was also trapped and needed rescuing, he was asking us to rescue his mom first, who was next to him under a slab of concrete that had been the floor above theirs. She was conscious and talking to us as well. We requested companies to report to the north side of the building, including our heavy rescue squad (SQ69), a technical rescue fire company (Engine 43), and one of our fire companies equipped and trained for hazardous materials incidents (Engine 17). They were directed to bring their lifting air bags and hydraulic lifting equipment as well as their equipment for breaking and breaching concrete. These companies were assigned the task of rescuing the boy and his mom.
We continued our size-up to the south side of the collapse and found part of the crew of Aerial 19, a technical rescue fire company, assisting people up from the underground parking garage to safety. Up on the rubble, two more victims were trapped on the south side of the pile. Part of the Aerial 19 crew was helping them, along with Engine 7 and Engine 63 crews.
At that time, occupants on their balconies on the east side of the building were screaming for help. We told them we were coming for them. I requested additional companies to assist with the rescue of the people trapped in the rubble; many were severely injured. One of them was a young girl whose leg looked extremely injured and was obviously fractured. I grabbed one of the firefighters from Aerial 19 and we secured all the backboards from the closest units including Stokes baskets. The backboards were used to secure the patients and take them down the pile and to the front for medical treatment of their injuries.
The second occupant we encountered on the south side was an older woman who I believed at the time was the young girl’s mother and now know that she was. I did not get to see her up close, but the crews were securing her to a backboard to bring her down from close to the top of the rubble pile.
As we came back to the north side, the young boy trapped with his mom had been freed and taken to be treated. I then encountered the Special Operations Branch manager and gave him a face-to-face report of conditions, rescue operations in progress, and what else needed to be done.
Our next task was to enter and search the part of the building that was still standing and get occupants out whose exit paths were blocked by collapsed concrete. Our heavy rescue lieutenant requested a face-to-face with me since rescuers were having difficulty lifting the slab off the mom who was trapped with her son.
At that time, one of the structural engineers had arrived, and I told the SQ69 lieutenant that I was going to get the engineer to see if he could devise a better plan to rescue the mom. As the lieutenant, the structural engineer, and I were returning to the trapped mom, we were advised over the radio they were successful in getting her out.
I was asked by the Special Ops Branch manager to come back with the engineer so we could get into the building. At that time, all the victims who were visible in or on the pile had been taken to the treatment area. Crews were directed to continue searching the pile again, looking and listening for additional trapped victims.
The engineer was assigned to Engine 2’s captain, and they worked together to devise a plan to search each floor as the engineer assessed their stability. The Special Ops Branch manager assigned me one technical rescue unit to search, and one hazmat unit helped search and meter the building for any hazardous gas. The plan was to do a quick search of the floors, knocking on living unit doors and helping anyone who answered. Since the engineers had only just started their assessment of the building, the fear of that part of the building collapsing was still on everyone’s mind. We were operating with the thought of not if but when the rest of the building was going to collapse. We had 911 phone calls coming in from occupants and saw people shining their flashlights to tell us they were trapped on the upper floors (photo 4).
(4) A view of the 08 rooms, where people were shining flashlights to alert rescuers.
Platform 21, the tower ladder, had completed rescuing the people it could reach on the street side of the building, and I asked the company officer to position the apparatus to create an escape route for us on the street side as well as to receive any occupants we found.
We had tried by this time to enter the building through the lobby. The front doors were blocked by the ceiling that had collapsed, and we broke through one of the side windows.
There was no access to the stairs from the lobby. We had to climb down through the rubble and into the underground parking garage. I was assigned Ladder 46 (a technical recue suppression unit) and Engine 56 (a hazmat suppression unit). The garage had flooded from a water line that broke. We could smell gasoline in the air as we made our way to the stairwell entrance. We later found out from the hazmat chief that the gasoline from all the cars that had been crushed had leaked out and was floating on the standing water.
Once we entered the building, we could see that the lowest floor with living units was the second floor. We located what was apartment 208 and forced our way in to make an escape route to the front side and our tower ladder unit in the front. Our plan now would be to bring any residents we found in the building to the street side and have the tower ladder bring them down. Everyone agreed that this was a better plan than taking occupants down through the flooded parking garage with leaking fuel and then having to carry them back up the rubble to safety. I spoke with the officer of the tower ladder to advise her of our plan and told her to cut the railings on the balconies so we could help occupants into the bucket without having to lift them over the railing.
We continued our search of the building following the engineer’s assessment, who had cleared most of the floors above us. We received a request for help from the engineers to force doors on the 11th floor. Ladder 46 was tasked to proceed to them and help.
The engineers advised that only one person could be on a section of return stairs above the ninth floor. The stairwell had pulled away from the portion of the building that was standing, and the cracks only got bigger the higher we climbed. I continued our primary search with Engine 57’s crew. We located an elderly resident on the fourth floor with a walker and brought him to unit 407, where the tower ladder was able to bring him down to the ground after cutting the balcony railings.
When we reached the seventh floor, the Special Operations Branch manager had received a report from command that occupants had called from the fourth floor saying that they had heard us but were unable to get to their door. The search plan was modified, and we were tasked with clearing every apartment on each floor by forcing every door that we could not open (photos 5-7).
(5) Firefighters climbing the stairwell on the C side to search floors. The entrance from the underground parking garage. A crack in the elevator shaft wall is visible in the top right of the photo.
(6) Fallen debris inside of the stairwell that rescuers ascended.
(7) Cracks in the stairwell walls.
I made the request for additional companies equipped with mechanical forcible entry tools to open the sturdy apartment doors. Before the arrival of the mechanical tools, we began forcing the door of unit 208 with a sledgehammer. Forcing the unit’s substantial door required a lot of power with the sledgehammer, and we could feel the floor shaking with every blow to the door. Since we all were still very fearful that at any moment that part of the building could collapse, we requested special tools for forcing doors that did not require the force of striking the door. These tools did not cause the vibrations to the building when opening doors. At the time of forcing these doors, I thought, “Who would leave their apartment under these circumstances and lock the door behind them?”
Some of the additional crews assigned were the technical rescue companies that had assisted with getting the young boy and his mom out. These companies were equipped with several hydraulic tools that can be used to force doors. I also had Engine 7’s crew with the remaining crew from Engine 2 that was attached to them, since their captain had been assigned to the engineers. Those crews were brought into the building in the bucket of the tower ladder into 407. Engine 7’s and 2’s crew were tasked at that point to finish searching the fourth floor and work their way down to the second.
Ladder 46 was on the penthouse floor with the engineers and tasked with starting their search there and working their way down. Engine 56 was sent to the fifth floor to work their way up. The heavy rescue SQ69 crew was sent to the sixth floor to work their way up. The search continued with crews being sent to the next floor either above or below that needing to be searched and reporting to the Special Ops Branch manager with the units that were searched on each floor. The only units left on each floor that were searchable were units ending in 09, which were directly to the left of the stairwell when exiting. Units 08, 07, 06, and 05 were in the hallway directly across from the stairs, with the 08s being on the south side of the building and 05s on the north end. The apartment doors directly on the north end of the hallway were the 04s. Those apartments were part of the collapsed portion, and we were not able to open those doors because of the debris behind them.
The hallway that would have led us to the other apartments, 01 through 03, and apartments ending in 10, 11, and 12 was gone; a gaping hole in the pile was all that was left. An elderly resident and her live-in nurse were found on the ninth floor in 909. They were the ones shining a flashlight to us on the back side of the building. We brought them into 908, but that was above the reach of the tower ladder. We decided to help them down to the fourth floor where we had removed the other residents.
The other units continued the search of all apartments until we had searched every one. At some point during the search, we heard from a company operating outside the building that the cracks in the wall on the north side seemed to be getting bigger. My heart skipped a beat at hearing that, and I advised crews to work as quickly as possible so we could exit the building.
Once the search was complete, I lost my sense of time of how long we had worked on the pile or in the building. To me, it seemed like it all took about 20 to 30 minutes. I told all companies to meet on the fourth floor to exit using the tower ladder. One of the crews’ officers noted that the tower ladder would only be able to lower one crew at a time and suggested that we should just exit using the stairwell. I agreed and all companies were ordered out of the building; the tower ladder was advised to bring its bucket down and away from the building.
All companies exiting the building were sent to our rehab area along the beach, and I reported to the Special Ops command post to give a briefing on our operation and what we saw inside. Shortly after I talked with our branch manager, he went to brief the IC.
While at the command post, the search K9 units advised that one of the dogs alerted for a possible live victim somewhere in the underground parking garage. I raised command since they were on a different radio channel and told them I was heading into the parking garage with the engineer, Ladder 46 officer, and Aerial 19 officer.
We went into the garage in the area where the dog had indicated, and we could hear someone calling for help. We called out that we heard and were trying to get to him. We immediately redirected all our efforts and available resources to removing debris and rigging shoring (support columns) under the collapsed portion of the building near where we heard the trapped victim. This included nontechnical units to augment persons for nontechnical tasks. The additional units I was assigned were Engine 43 (technical suppression unit), Engine 08, Rescue 40, our Technical Rescue Bureau captain, and one of our hazmat support lieutenants. Debris had to be moved by hand to get close enough to make a tunnel into the collapsed portion of the building.
We were looking at the parking garage ceiling that had collapsed. It was an eight- to 10-inch-thick rebar-reinforced concrete slab. Now we were working underneath the building in a flooded garage with gasoline that not only were our hazmat meters detecting but that we could smell in the air. We also had carbon monoxide readings in the parking garage at the time but did not know the source.
We started ventilation to continue working in the garage. Units began removing debris by hand and into buckets so we could get close enough to the collapsed ceiling. We needed to place some shoring to support what was left of the ceiling and to have some sort of indication if anything was shifting (photos 8-10).
(8) Crews working in the underground parking garage. Gasoline is floating on top of the standing water.
(9) Rescue operations in the underground parking garage.
(10) Debris removal for rescue operations in the underground parking garage.
I was relieved by my A Shift counterpart around 0930-1000 hours. I came out from under the garage after giving him a face-to-face debriefing of our current efforts to try to rescue the victim we could hear. I later learned that the victim did not survive; however, the heroic actions of MDFR personnel in the first few hours after the collapse did result in the rescue of several trapped occupants.
Rogelio Vandamas has 26 years of service with Miami-Dade County (FL) Fire Rescue and is chief fire officer of Battalion 12, the Technical Rescue Battalion, on the C Shift.
This is my firsthand account of the events as they unfolded at Surfside on Friday night. At this point in the incident, companies and chiefs from all over Miami-Dade County were rotated to work in 12-hour operational periods. I am chief of MDFR Battalion 10, located in the extreme southwest portion of Miami-Dade County. The collapse occurred in Battalion 1, in the extreme northeast portion of the county.
I arrived with Engine 6 at 1900 hours and was assigned as operations deputy. After surveying the site, it was apparent that a deep-seated fire in the A/B corner was spreading under the rubble, as acrid yellow smoke was starting to push out as far as the C/D side of the pile (photo 1). We later learned the color of the smoke was a result of foam insulation burning under the concrete. Chiefs directing operations agreed that all efforts had to be focused on controlling the fire spread, fanned by winds off the Atlantic Ocean, or the entire pile could be on fire by morning. We were limited in our tactics because we were advised by structural engineers not to disturb the A/B corner because of the potential collapse of the portion of the building still standing.
(1) In the hours following the collapse, a deep-seated fire developed in the rubble and quickly spread, fanned by strong winds off the Atlantic Ocean. (Photos courtesy of Miami-Dade Fire Rescue.)
The initial tactic was to direct elevated master streams to the A/B corner while crews directed streams from the C/D side using ground monitors (photos 2, 3). We could see the ground monitors were having little to no effect, and we needed a more direct attack with handlines.
(2, 3) Conditions worsened as streams from ground monitors were largely ineffective.
Engine 6 Lieutenant Eric Sarduy and his crew hand-stretched hundreds of feet of three-inch hose to supply 1¾-inch lines. This was an extremely difficult stretch over debris. Engine 6’s crew operated a handline to attempt to stop further spread by “surgically” applying water into cracks and openings in the pile (photos 5, 6).
(4) Firefighters stretched hundreds of feet of three-inch hose to supply handlines. In the background, a tower ladder operated its elevated master streams.
(5) Engine 6’s crew advanced a handline over the debris to “surgically” direct their stream into cracks and openings in the rubble.
At this point in the incident, heavy equipment was in operation. We saw firsthand that the most powerful heavy equipment is only as safe and effective as the skill of its operators. The skill of the heavy equipment operators at this incident was remarkable—operating their machines in close proximity to our personnel operating hand and power tools and often digging by hand.
One of the machines operating at the collapse was called a “nibbler”—a concrete crushing machine mounted on the end of a backhoe. The nibbler can take a bite out of extremely thick concrete and shear #8 rebar, which is one inch in diameter. Using the nibbler, operators attempted cut a break in the pile from the middle of the B side across toward the middle of the D side.
(6-8) The “nibbler” meticulously removed debris in an attempt to cut a break in the rubble pile before the fire took possession of the entire collapse site.
Around midnight, after little success with the previous tactics, several structural engineers on site were advised of the worsening situation. Considering the risk vs. gain, the structural engineers were persuaded to allow operation of the nibbler at the A/B corner to gain direct access to the deep-seated fire (photos 6-8). After slow, meticulous debris removal by the nibbler, crews were finally able to extinguish the fire by Saturday morning. This allowed the search and rescue operations to resume.
Brian Gelabert is a battalion chief and a 22-year veteran of Miami-Dade (FL) Fire Rescue. He is certified as a technical rescue technician, an air/rescue helicopter flight medic, and an air-deployable SCUBA diver. Gelabert is a shipboard firefighter and was a fireboat captain before his promotion. He is chief in Battalion 10, located in southern Miami-Dade County.